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Introduction 
By THE NARROWEST OF VOTES (a 7 to 7 split on perhaps its most controversial conclusion), in fifteen opinions (including six dissents), 
totaling 270 pages, following eleven days of hearings during which twenty,five 
States testified and more than 30 submitted written materials, l the 
International Court ofJustice (ICJ or World Court), on 8 July 1996, provided 
the United Nations General Assembly with a nonbinding advisory opinion2 on 
the lawfulness of using, or threatening to use, nuclear weapons. In the process, 
it solemnly affirmed the obvious, obfuscated the serious, and on at least one 
important issue that was not even raised by the General Assembly's request 
almost certainly reached the wrong conclusion with decisive unanimity. In the 
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process, it may have inadvertently and gratuitously undermined the prospects 
for international peace and world order on the eve of the new millennium. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the opinion was quickly "interpreted" for the 
media by the "spin-doctors" representing such groups as the original 
"ban-the-bomb" Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND),3 Greenpeace,4 
and the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms,s as a 
decisive victory for opponents of nuclear weapons-ignoring the fact that their 
most vociferous defenders on the Court had issued strong dissenting opinions, 
while at the same time the opinion was generally welcomed by prominent U.S. 
Government lawyers6 as about as harmless a decision as anyone could have 
anticipated under the circumstances, especially given the opinion's political 
genesis.? 
Particularly revealing were the reactions of the Japanese mayors of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, who had made impassioned appeals to the Court to 
declare nuclear weapons illegal. Hiroshima Mayor Takashi Hiraoka told 
reporters that "the outcome looks as if to approve of the status quo," and 
suggested that "the court is controlled by nuclear powers."s Nagasaki Mayor 
Itcho Ito expressed his "anger" at the World Court's opinion, declaring to the 
"I l' I d,,9 press: Ie t enrage .... 
In reality, despite some serious shortcomings, once properly understood, the 
core of the advisory opinion was consistent with well-established principles of 
international law and is largely to be welcomed. Nevertheless, because it will 
certainly continue to be cited in national and international policy debates in 
the coming years-and some generally reputable authorities have already 
clearly been mislediO-it is important to understand what the Court did and 
did not say, and to identify a few clear shortcomings in the opinion. 
There were initially two separate requests before the World Court for an 
advisory opinion on this issue, but the one brought by the World Health 
Organization was turned down by the Court because it was outside the lawful 
scope of the WHO's responsibilities.ll While the United States and several 
other countries urged the Court to use its discretion and reject the companion 
request from the General Assembly as well, the authority of the Assembly to 
seek such an opinion was obvious.12 
The General Assembly had taken the position in nonbinding13 resolutions as 
early as 24 November 1961, that "the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear 
weapons is ... a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nationsj,,14 
however, these were typically approved by narrow votes that were hardly 
indicative of a broad international consensus. IS Furthermore, even some of the 
General Assembly resolutions seemed to recognize that no legal rule had yet 
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been established outlawing nuclear weapons per se; for example, an ambiguous 
1978 resolution asserted that "the use of nuclear weapons ... should . .. be 
prohibited .... "16 
Responding to an mltlatlve launched by several anti~nuclear 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), on 15 December 1994, the UN 
General Assembly approved Resolution 49/75 K, which provided in part that 
the Assembly: 
Decides, pursuant to Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United 
Nations, to request the International Court of Justice urgently to render its 
advisory opinion on the following question: "Is the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons in any circumstances permitted under international law?" 
The resolution was approved by a vote of 78 to 43, with 38 abstentions. 
Thus, only a plurality of those States voting registered support for such an 
advisory opinion; or, put differently, a slight majority of the organization did 
not approve the request. While the Charter seems to exclude abstentions in 
determining the outcome of a votep the Court might certainly have 
considered this reality in deciding whether to respond positively to the request. 
More significantly, an argument might be made that the resolution itself 
required a two-thirds majority to pass pursuant to the second paragraph of 
Article 18 of the Charter18-on the theory that urging the World Court to 
declare nuclear weapons per se illegal (the clear objective of the resolution) 
could have the potential to undermine the entire system of nuclear deterrence 
upon which international peace and stability have been premised for fifty years. 
Writing about the Court's decision while still a New York University law 
professor, the current Deputy Legal Adviser to the United Nations argued that 
"it would not have been difficult to hold that a question relating to the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons" falls under the two~thirds majority requirement, but 
noted that "inexplicably no representative objected" on these grounds. 
Nevertheless, he concluded: "It would seem that the Court, in perhaps 
unseemly eagerness to address what is evidently one of the most interesting and 
important current legal questions, failed to consider the possibly most serious 
objection to its jurisdiction to do SO.,,19 
Misstating the Question 
There is a more fundamental problem with the General Assembly 
resolution: It was not phrased in the language of international law, and ind~ed 
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seemed calculated to shift the burden of proof from those who argued that 
nuclear weapons were unlawful to those who felt otherwise. The underlying 
premise of modem international relations is that sovereign States are coequal 
and generally independent of constraints except to the degree they consent to 
limitations on their freedom of action (normally in exchange for similar 
constraints on the conduct of other States), either through treaties and other 
international agreements or by a consistent practice that States recognize as 
reflecting a legal obligation. The burden thus falls upon those who claim a 
breach has occurred to identify the conventional or customary legal rule that 
limits the sovereign discretion of the State accused of the breach. 
The classic statement of this principle was made by the Permanent Court of 
InternationalJustice-the predecessor to the ICJ established under the League 
of Nations-in the landmark 1927 case of the S.S. Lotus: 
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of 
law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed 
in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles oflaw and 
established in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing 
independent communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims. 
Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.20 
This principle was reaffirmed by the ICJ as recently as the 1986 Paramilitary 
Activities case,zl and the improper wording of the 1994 resolution was objected 
to by several States in their written and oral presentations to the Court.22 The 
Court essentially ruled this harmless error,23 while at the same time 
acknowledging: "State practice shows that the illegality of the use of certain 
weapons as such does not result from an absence of authorization but, on the 
contrary, is formulated in terms of prohibitions.,,24 
However, it was clear from the declarations and opinions of the individual 
judges that accompanied the Court's opinion that the Lotus principle is under 
assault by judges from the Third World who wish to see greater constraints 
placed upon States without having to obtain their consent. Thus, President 
Bedjaoui of Algeria contended in his Declaration that, while the Lotus case had 
"expressed the spirit of the times": 
It scarcely needs to be said that the fact of contemporary international society is 
much altered .... The resolutely positivist, voluntatist approach of international 
law which still held sway at the beginning of the century-and to which the 
Permanent Court also gave its support in the aforementioned [Lotus] 
judgment-has been replaced by an objective conception of international law, a 
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law more readily seen as the reflection of a collective juridical conscience and as 
a response to the social necessities of States organized as a community.25 
Restricting the Right of Self, Defense 
The real question before the Court was actually far narrower than might at 
first appear from a reading of the General Assembly's Resolution, as it was 
universally agreed that possession of nuclear weapons did not confer some sort 
of immunity from the prohibition against the aggressive use of force embodied 
in the UN Charter.26 Thus, the only real question to be addressed was not 
whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons was ever lawful, but whether 
international law prohibited a State in possession of nuclear weapons from 
using them, or threatening to use them, under any conceivable circumstances 
in a defensive response to armed international aggression.27 
Indeed, since deterrence itself is premised upon an implied "threat" to use 
whatever existing weapons may be necessary and otherwise lawful in the event 
of aggression, the ICJ was essentially being asked to outlaw the most powerful 
instrument in international relations for the dissuasion of aggression and the 
promotion of peace.28 The Court does not appear to have focused on this 
reality, although it was at least implicit in the statements of some of the States 
who provided comments.29 One of the most compelling reasons for the Court 
to have exercised its discretion3o and not issued the requested opinion-in 
addition to the fact that a majority of the General Assembly had not supported 
the request, and several States had warned that such an opinion might 
undermine diplomatic negotiations-was that the most likely consequence of 
even hinting that nuclear weapons were per se unlawful might well be to 
undermine the policy of nuclear deterrence that has worked so well for 
half,a,century in keeping the world out of World War III. This point will be 
addressed infra.3l 
The Proper Legal Standard 
The proper role of the International Court of} ustice is not to decide what 
result a majority of judges believe to be good public policy or "fair" or 
"just,,,32 or to divine legal rules from deep meditation, but to determine 
whether the presumptive right of sovereign States to pursue their perceived 
interests in a specific manner has been limited by an established rule of 
international law. As the Court acknowledged: "It is clear that the Court 
cannot legislate .... ,,33 
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Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ sets forth the sources of international law 
the Court may use in deciding whether c;:onduct has been prohibited: 
Article 38 
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international 
law such disputes. as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles oflaw recognized by civilized nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings 
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules oflaw. 
Ascertaining the Relevant Law 
Thus, the role of the Court was to examine each of these sources of law to 
ascertain whether, and if so to what extent, they might limit the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons and then to inquire whether there were any conceivable 
defensive settings in which the threat or use of a nuclear weapon might not be 
in conflict with any such legal rules. The basic inquiry was whether 
international law included a per se prohibition against every threat or use of 
nuclear weapons and that the proper test was not the "worst case" setting of a 
massive aggressive assault involving the delivery of thousands of large nuclear 
devices against another State's cities, but rather the "best case"-such as a use 
of a nuclear weapon on the High Seas to destroy an enemy warship preparing to 
launch weapons of mass destruction against the civilian population of the State 
seeking to defend itself.34 
International Conventions. Quite correctly, no State contended before the 
Court that nuclear weapons were free from constraints under international 
law. On the contrary, the nuclear powers readily conceded that any threat or 
use of such weapons must comply with the jus ad bellum governing the initiation 
of hostilities and the jus in bello regulating the conduct of military 
operations-some provisions of which were embodied in treaties and others in 
customary law.35 • 
For example, it was universally acknowledged that the UN Charter limited 
any threat or use of nuclear (or any other) weapons to acts of individual or 
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collective self,defense or when authorized by the UN Security Council.36 
Similarly, it was accepted without dissent that the laws of armed conflict-
prohibiting such behavior as attacks on noncombatants, the infliction of 
unnecessary suffering, and the use of weapons that are incapable of 
discriminating between combatants and noncombatants-are applicable to 
nuclear weapons.3? 
The Court is to be commended for rejecting a variety of assertions by 
opponents of nuclear weapons, such as that Article 6 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (guaranteeing the "inherent right to 
life") outlawed the defensive use of nuclear weapons in combat (a contrary 
holding would presumably have outlawed all lethal weapons).38 It also rejected 
claims that a variety of environmental treaties implicitly outlawed nuclear 
weapons,39 that various treaties prohibiting "poisonous weapons" applied to 
nuclear weapons,40 or that any use of nuclear weapons would constitute 
genocideY 
The States which denied the existence of a per se prohibition on nuclear 
weapons recognized that there were a variety of treaties and international 
agreements imposing legal limits on nuclear weapons, ranging from bilateral 
arms control agreements negotiated by the United States and the former 
Soviet Union to multilateral treaties prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear 
weapons in outer space, on the seabed or ocean floor, and in several geographic 
"nuclear,free" zones.42 
After a lengthy discussion, the Court concluded that while the growing 
number of treaties limiting nuclear weapons might be seen as "foreshadowing a 
future general prohibition on the use of such weapons, . . . they do not 
constitute such a prohibition by themselves."43 In this connection, the Court 
noted that under several of these treaties "the nuclear,weapon States have 
reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances," and "these 
reservations met with no objection from the [other treaty] parties ... or from 
the Security Council.,,44 
International Custom. As already noted, historically, and as a general principle 
today, States are only obligated to abide by legal rules to which they have 
individually consented-either by entering into treaties or other international 
agreements intended to be binding under international law, or by joining in a 
widespread practice with other States out of the belief (opinio juris) that it is an 
obligation of international law. The provisions of treaties do not normally 
constrain States which have not consented to be so bound, and a State which 
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persistently registers its objection to an emerging rule of customary 
international law is normally not bound by that rule. 
However, there is an exception to the general principle that a State must 
consent to be bound by a legal rule. Since the Court's Statute was written, a 
consensus has emerged that certain "peremptory norms" of international law 
are of such fundamental importance that they will be imposed even upon 
persistent objectors despite their lack of consent. Often identified by the Latin 
expression jus cogens, these principles have been so universally embraced 
through all major legal systems, and the consequences of their breach are 
viewed as so objectionable, that the collective world community basically 
agreed to impose them on all States. Classic examples include the prohibition 
embodied in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibiting the aggressive use of 
military force, the prohibition against certain categories of large~scale murder 
contained in the Genocide Convention, and the prohibitions against piracy 
and the slave trade. 
The Court acknowledged the existence of such "intransgressible principles 
of international customary law,,45 in the Nuclear Weapons case, but such norms 
were not critical to the decision. The standard for constituting a preemptory 
norm of international law is considerably higher than that for normal rules of 
customary law, and there are no jus cogens rules that are not clearly also 
customary law. Once having found that there were no rules of customary law 
prohibiting every threat or use of nuclear weapons,46 it was unnecessary for the 
Court to ask whether these norms had achieved peremptory status. 
To be sure, no country has actually used a nuclear weapon in hostilities since 
1945; but the Court rejected assertions that this was evidence of customary law 
because of the clear absence of an opinio juris.47 Another contention that was 
rejected was that a series of UN General Assembly resolutions should be 
accepted as evidence of a customary rule. While the General Assembly has no 
general "lawmaking" authority,48 its resolutions can, when overwhelmingly 
supported by member States, serve as evidence of the existence of an opinio 
juris. However, as the Court observed, the antinuclear resolutions often 
provided that nuclear weapons "should be prohibited," and they were "adopted 
with substantial numbers of negative votes and abstentions," leading the Court 
to conclude: "although those resolutions are a clear sign of deep concern 
regarding the problem of nuclear weapons; they still fall short of establishing 
the existence of an opinio juris on the illegality of the use of such weapons."49 
General Principles of Law, National Judicial Decisions, and Scholarly 
Writings. The basic nature of the issue before the Court precluded serious 
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recourse to "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations," as the 
question of threatening or using nuclear weapons is inherently international in 
character.50 While the Court did note that it was "not called upon to deal with 
an internal use of nuclear weapons,,,51 it is obvious that "civilized nations" have 
not formulated special "principles of law" governing the domestic use of 
nuclear weapons. Similarly, there was little recourse to such "subsidiary means" 
for determining legal rules as national judicial opinions and scholarly 
treatises.52 
The Dispositif 
The Dispositif, or operative provisions, of the Nuclear Weapons case 
consisted of six conclusions in paragraph 105 of the opinion, half of which were 
little more than what the Court's Vice President (and current President) 
acknowledged to be "anodyne asseveration[s] of the obvious .... "53 Thus, no 
State has ever contended that there was any "specific authorization of the 
threat or use of nuclear weapons" in customary or conventional international 
law,54 and including a sentence on this point made little legal sense other than 
as a political concession to the framers of the General Assembly Resolution 
who had couched their request in such terms. 
Similarly, deciding that "a threat or use of force by means of nuclear 
weapons that is contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations 
Charter and that fails to meet all the requirements of Article 51, is unlawful, "55 
is obviously tautological-akin to solemnly declaring that "an act prohibited by 
international law is unlawful." Again, the inclusion of such an obvious and 
unquestioned conclusion presumably can be explained as a concession either 
to the supporters of the General Assembly Resolution or to the Court 
dissenters who had wished to declare a per se prohibition. 
Of an essentially similar nature is the Court's unanimous conclusion that: 
A threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons should also be compatible 
with the requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict, 
particularly those of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, 
as well as with specific obligations under treaties and other undertakings which 
expressly deal with nuclear weapons .... 56 
Again, the nuclear,weapons States had conceded all of these points,57 which 
have to this writer's knowledge never been seriously in dispute. Such obvious 
conclusions hardly justified the time and money invested in the process by the 
General Assembly, the Court, or the member States. 
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Turning to more controversial matters, by a still decisive vote of 
eleven,to,three, the Court decided: 
There is in neither customary nor conventional international law any 
comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons 
as such .... 58 
This was perhaps the most important part of the decision, both because of the 
Court's nearly four,to,one majority on the issue and because it answered the 
basic legal questions implicit in the General Assembly's request. 
To be sure, the Assembly had actually asked whether there were any 
circumstances in which the threat or use of nuclear weapons was permitted 
under international law, but the Court quite properly had rephrased the answer 
to be consistent with the reality that international law permits that which is not 
prohibited.59 Indeed, had the Court limited its reply to this sentence-perhaps 
accompanied by language noting that the lawfulness of any use of a nuclear 
weapon, like all other weapons not prohibited per se by international law, must 
be determined in the context of both why and how they are threatened or 
used-it would have been an excellent opinion. 
Perhaps the most controversial of the Court's conclusions reads: 
It follows from the above,mentioned requirements [of the international law of 
armed conflict] that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be 
contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in 
particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law; 
However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of 
fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance 
of self,defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake .... 60 
Perhaps the first observation that should be made about this part of the 
Court's Dispositif is that it was not initially reached by the majority vote normally 
required by the Court's Statute.61 Judge Andres Aguilar Mawdsley, of Venezuela, 
died in October 1995, a month before the case was argued-leaving a Court of 
only fourteen members, who divided evenly, seven,to,seven, on this conclusion. 
Since in contentious cases it is highly undesirable for tribunals to be unable to 
reach a decision, the Court's Statute provides: 
In the event of an equality of votes, the President or the judge who acts in his 
place shall have a casting vote.62 
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Because of the application of this rule, President Bedjaoui of Algeria-who 
in his separate Declaration characterized nuclear weapons as "the ultimate 
evil,,63-was permitted to cast a second vote, bringing the official count on this 
provision to eight,to,seven. One might note that this outcome was totally a 
coincidence of timing, for had the vote occurred less than a year later, after the 
distinguished American jurist Steven Schwebel was elected President of the 
Court, a different opinion would presumably have resulted. 
As an aside, one might argue that the Court has the discretion to withhold 
the "casting vote" procedure in advisory opinions. The considerations which 
encourage the definitive resolution of contentious disputes between or among 
States are not so clearly applicable in the case of a request for an advisory 
opinion. The Statute gives the Court discretion to decide which of its 
procedural rules are "applicable" to an advisory opinion,64 and it would have 
been consistent with the Statute65 and fully responsive to the General Assembly 
to reply that: 
(1) International law does not prohibit the threat or use of nuclear weapons per 
sej 
(2) Like all weapons, the threat or use of nuclear weapons must comply with 
existingjtls ad bellum andjus in bello, 
(3) Based upon the Court's understanding66 of the nature of such weapons, their 
use would only be lawful in an exceptional settingj and 
(4) In the absence of more detailed information about the characteristics of the 
weapon in question, its intended target, the purpose for which the threat or use 
of nuclear weapons is made, and many other circumstances, the Court is unable 
to provide more specific meaningful advice that would be applicable to every 
situation. 
In any event, the weight to be accorded the Court's nonbinding "advice" to the 
General Assembly on this point ought to be evaluated in the context of the 
evenly split vote that produced it; and the "casting vote" procedure should be 
recognized as the jurisprudential equivalent of a coin toss. ' 
However, having said that, one might also note that, under the 
circumstances, the basic conclusion is not all that remarkable. Essentially, the 
Court is saying that by the narrowest of possible margins it has decided that it 
cannot decide whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful, 
even "in an extreme circumstance"; and, given the horrific consequences 
commonly associated with any use of nuclear weapons, such a cautious 
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conclusion is not all that surprising-particularly in the absence of a concrete 
case or detailed information about the characteristics of modem (or future 
generations of) nuclear weapons. 
Indeed, had the Court merely reported that it "cannot conclude definitively 
whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an 
extreme circumstance of self,defence," omitting the further qualifying 
language "in which the very survival of a State would be at stake," this writer 
would probably have found that reasonable and acceptable. Given the stakes 
involved, speculative conclusions in the absence of necessary facts probably 
serve little purpose. 
One certainly can embrace the Court's recognition that international 
humanitarian law would preclude the use of nuclear weapons in other than 
"extreme circumstances," but to conclude further than such circumstances 
would necessarily have to involve "a threat to the survival of a State" is 
unwarranted by any established or identified legal rule. As shall presently be 
demonstrated, there are easily conceivable settings in which a State might have 
no effective alternative to using a nuclear weapon to neutralize a threat to the 
lives of millions of its civilians, even though the State might nevertheless 
continue to exist if it elected to endure such a sacrifice. And if there is any 
principle of international humanitarian law that precludes even a threat to use 
nuclear weapons as a means of deterring illegal international aggression 
involving the use of unlawful weapons of mass destruction, the Court has failed 
to identify it. Indeed, any rule that would prohibit a State in lawful possession 
of nuclear weapons from even threatening to use them defensively to preserve 
the lives of tens of millions of innocent noncombatants would stand as clear 
evidence that law had become part of the problem-or, in the words of 
Dickens: "If the law supposes that, the law is a ass, a idiot.,,67 
Dangerous Ambiguity: The World Court and the Use of Nuclear 
Weapons in Defense of Third States 
The Court does not in the Dispositif clarify whether a distinction exists 
between threatening or using nuclear weapons in response to "extreme 
circumstances of self,defense" threatening the survival of the nuclear,weapons 
State itself, and a threat by such a State to use nuclear weapons in collective 
defense against a threat to the survival of a third State; however, elsewhere in 
the opinion there is a reference to a State using nuclear weapons "in an 
extreme circumstance of self,defence, in which its very survival would be at 
stake.,,68 This is an alarming statement, and it is contrary to the spirit of the 
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United Nations Charter, which expressly recognizes "the inherent right of 
individual or collective self~defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member 
of the United Nations."69 Senator Arthur Vandenberg, who chaired the 
subcommittee of Commission III at San Francisco that actually drafted Article 
51, explained to his Senate colleagues in 1949: 
To make a long story short, Latin-America rebelled-and so did we. If the 
omission [of the right of collective self-defense] had not been rectified there 
would have been no Charter. It was rectified, finally, after infinite travail, by 
agreement upon article 51 of the Charter. Nothing in the Charter is of greater 
immediate importance and nothing in the Charter is of equal potential 
importance.7o 
Similarly, in explaining this proVisIon to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee in July 1945, John Foster Dulles affirmed: 
At San Francisco, one of the things which we stood for most stoutly, and which 
we achieved with the greatest difficulty, was a recognition of the fact that that 
doctrine of self-defense, enlarged at Chapultepec to be a doctrine of collective 
self-defense, could stand unimpaired and could function without the approval of 
the Security Council. 71 
There is a strong argument that the right of sovereign States to use necessary 
and proportional lethal force in defense against armed international aggression 
is not only "inherent," as the English~language text of Article 51 terms it, but 
also "imprescriptable" (as the Russian text of Article 51 asserts72) or 
"inalienable" (as the United States argued in 192873). In his separate opinion, 
Judge Fleischhauer (Germany) argued that the Court could also have found 
legal support for this right in "the general principles of law recognized in all 
legal systems," as it is universally recognized "that no legal system is entitled to 
demand the self-abandonment, the suicide, of one of its subjects."74 This view 
was also embraced by President Bedjaoui, who acknowledged that «[a] State's 
right to survival is ... a fundamental law, similar in many respects to a 'natural' 
law.,,75 It is certainly not a right to be narrowed by judicial fiat of the World 
Court, and anyone asserting that a victim of aggression may not defend itselfby 
the use oflawful weapons, against lawful targets, in compliance with the law of 
armed conflict--or may not obtain voluntary assistance from other 
peaceloving States in meeting the aggression collectively-has the burden of 
identifying the legal basis for such a rule in conventional or customary 
international law. The principle of acting collectively to meet threats to the 
peace is not only unimpaired by the Charter, it is the very first objective 
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embodied in the Charter76; and simple declarations, unsupported by 
compelling legal authority, asserting or implying such limitations, are 
insufficient--even when they emanate from the World Court. As the Court 
has acknowledged, it "cannot legislate,,,77 yet a careful reading of their opinions 
suggests that "legislate" is exactly what some of the judges attempted to do.78 
Few legal doctrines have been more critical in deterring aggression and 
promoting peace than the recognized right of relatively weak victims of 
aggression to call upon other peaceloving members of the world community for 
assistance in the event they are victims of armed international aggression; and 
why the World Court seems determined to undermine this important Charter 
principle is unclear.79 In essence, the World Court seems to be announcing that 
States that can acquire weapons of mass destruction and do not respect the rule 
of law will be free to use them at will against weaker peaceloving States that 
lack such weapons-because the nuclear,weapons States will be prohibited by 
international law from responding (or even threatening to respond) in kind to 
even the most flagrant criminal acts of aggression.8o This point is of more than 
academic importance, because one of the incentives in the Nuclear 
Non,Proliferation Treaty (NPT)81 to encourage States to forego their right to 
develop nuclear weapons was a promise, endorsed by the Security Council, that 
the nuclear,weapon States would come to their defense in the event they were 
threatened with nuclear weapons.82 As Judge Oda Oapan) said in the 
conclusion of his dissenting opinion in the case: 
One can conclude from the above that, on the one hand, the NPT regime which 
presupposes the possession of nuclear weapons by the five nuclear,weapon States 
has been firmly established and that, on the other, they have themselves given 
security assurances to the non,nuclear weapon States by certain statements they 
have made in the Security Council. ... It is generally accepted that this NPT 
regime is a necessary evil in the context of international security, where the 
doctrine of nuclear deterrence continues to be meaningful and valid.B3 
Pactum de Contrahendo or Pactum de Negotiando? 
The final paragraph of the Dispositif was also reached by unanimous 
decision: 
There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion 
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and 
effective international control.84 
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This part of the opinion may warrant more consideration than it has thus far 
received. While the General Assembly's request for an advisory opinion was 
clearly politically motivated and poorly phrased, the question focused entirely 
upon the existing legal status of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, and did 
not even suggest that advice was being sought on obligations to negotiate new 
limitations.85 Nevertheless, the Court sua sponte elected to address this 
issue-presumably as another consolation to States that had hoped or 
expected a decision that nuclear weapons are unlawful per se. 
Not surprisingly, this dicta did not escape the attention of the General 
Assembly, which in December 1996 approved a resolution thanking the Court, 
"taking note" of the opinion, and then resolving that the General Assembly: 
3. Underlines the unanimous conclusion of the Court that there exists an obligation 
to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear 
disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control; 
4. Calls upon all States to fulfill that obligation immediately by commencing 
multilateral negotiations in 1997 leading to an early conclusion of a 
nuclear-weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, 
deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and 
providing for their elimination.86 
Because dicta from the ICJ advisory opinion is being used to argue that a legal 
duty now exists to reach agreement on these issues, it is important to look more 
carefully at this part of the Court's opinion and at the legal theories upon which 
it is premised. 
By way of background, paragraph F of the Dispositif was premised upon 
Article VI of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which provides: 
Article VI 
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith 
on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early 
date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective international contro1.87 
In paragraphs 99 and 100 of its advisory opinion, the Court quotes this 
provision and then provides this conclusion: 
The legal importance of that obligation goes beyond that of a mere obligation of 
conduct; the obligation involved here is an obligation to achieve a precise 
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result-nuclear disarmament in all its aspects-by adopting a particular course 
of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good faith .... 
This twofold obligation to pursue and to conclude negotiations formally concerns 
the 182 States parties to the Treaty ... or, in other words, the vast majority of the 
international community.88 
Despite the unanimous vote on paragraph F of the Dispositif, the Court 
seems clearly to have confused two related legal concepts: an agreement to 
conclude a specific agreement in the future (pactum de contrahendo) and an 
agreement to negotiate in good faith in the future in an effort to reach 
agreement on a specified issue (pactum de negotiando). In this case, the Court's 
conclusion is simply not reconcilable with the text or travaux. of the agreement. 
It is submitted that Article VI of the NPT does not, and cannot reasonably be 
interpreted to,89 obligate treaty parties to conclude anything-the obligation is 
clearly only to "pursue negotiations in good faith" towards that end. 
The basic principles for interpreting international agreements are set forth 
in the Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties,9o which, while not binding 
as conventional law on all parties to the NPT, are widely recognized as 
reflecting customary international law. Under the heading "General rule of 
interpretation," the Convention provides, inter alia: 
Article 31 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of 
its object and purpose. 
The "ordinary meaning" of a promise to "pursue negotiations" is not "to 
reach an agreement"-which, if it has any meaning, presumably would require 
States to accept the best terms the other side was willing to offer.91 To be sure, 
the same obligation would exist for the second State-or in this instance for all 
of the 185 parties to the treaty. Does this mean that the first State to get to the 
World Court can obtain a judgment requiring all of the other treaty parties to 
"conclude" the treaty favored by the petitioning State? Since the so,called 
"obligation to ... conclude negotiations" is not simply for a disarmament 
treaty, but one incorporating "strict and effective international control," is it 
the proper role of the Court to consider the first proposal brought before it, and 
if in the Court's wisdom that proposal includes such control, to compel every 
other treaty party to adhere to those terms? Or does the Court instead intend 
to assume the legislative task of drafting perhaps hundreds of pages of highly 
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detailed and intrusive inspection and verification terms, to be imposed upon 
sovereign States irrespective of their consent? 
What, pray tell, is the Court then to do with the States that are not parties to 
the NPT and thus have clearly not consented to this alleged "obligation ... to 
conclude negotiations?" Having declared that all treaty parties must enter into 
"a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective 
international control," what is the Court then to do about the small number of 
non,parties to the treaty who do not elect either to surrender all of their 
weapons or to submit to the controls the Court seeks to impose upon treaty 
parties? Are they to be rewarded by being allowed to remain outside the 
disarmament regime-presumably expanding their arsenals (at "going, out, 
of,business" discount prices) as their neighbors are compelled by the Court to 
rid their territory of all weapons-or will the Court anoint the first 
"acceptable" draft treaty submitted to it by any treaty party as establishing ajus 
cogens obligation erga omnes? 
Perhaps the most interesting practical question raised by such an approach is 
how long the NPT would continue to exist before one State after another 
invoked its right under Article X to withdraw from the treaty-citing the 
out,of,control World Court as the "extraordinary event" that has "jeopardized 
the supreme interests of its country?"n Surely world peace and the rule of law 
would not be furthered by such an obvious misinterpretation of the NPT. 
Fortunately, the NPT is safe, because the World Court clearly reached the 
wrong conclusion in this nonbinding advisory opinion. The issue raised by 
Article VI of the NPT is not one of first impression in international law. Even 
, when the language of an agreement clearly provides that the parties will not 
just negotiate but conclude a future agreement, unless the terms are essentially 
fi..xed by reference to the original agreement, tribunals tend to treat them as 
nothing more than a commitment to negotiate in good faith. Thus, in the 1925 
Tacna Arica Award (Chile v. Peru)-which involved an agreement to conclude 
a future protocol to prescribe "the manner in which the plebiscite is to be 
carried out, and the terms and time for the payment by the nation which 
remains the owner of the provinces of Tacna and Arica"93-the arbitrator 
found: 
As the Parties agreed to enter into a special protocol, but did not fix its terms, 
their undertaking was in substance to negotiate in good faith to that end .... Neither 
Party waived the right to propose conditions which it deemed to be reasonable 
and appropriate to the holding of the plebiscite, or to oppose conditions proposed 
by the other Party which it deemed inadvisable. The agreement to make a special 
protocol with undefined terms did not mean that either Party was bound to make an 
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agreement unsatisfactory to itself provided it did not act in bad faith. Further, as the 
special protocol was to be made by sovereign States, it must also be deemed to be 
implied in the agreement . . . that these States should act respectively in 
accordance with their constitutional methods, and bad faith is not to be 
predicated upon the refusal of ratification of a particular proposed protocol 
deemed by the ratifying authority to be unsatisfactory.94 
In 1931, the predecessor to the current World Court-the Permanent 
Court of International Justice (PCrn-issued an Advisory Opinion on 
Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland95 at the request of the League of 
Nations. Summarized briefly, in an effort to resolve a quarrel between the two 
countries, the Council of the League of Nations had approved a resolution 
recommending "the two Governments to enter into direct negotiations as 
soon as possible in order to establish such relations between the two 
neighbouring States [as] will ensure 'the good understanding between 
nations upon which peace depends' .... "96 This resolution was accepted by 
both countries, and Poland subsequently contended that Lithuania was 
obligated to agree to reopen a section of railway between Vilna and Livau 
that had been destroyed dUring World War 1. 
The PCI] concluded that both States were legally bound by the "agreement 
to negotiate" contained in the Council's resolution, but rejected the Polish 
view that this was in reality a legal obligation "not only to negotiate but also to 
come to an agreement," explaining: 
The Court is indeed justified in considering that the engagement incumbent on 
the two Governments in conformity with the Council's Resolution is not only to 
enter into negotiations, but also to pursue them as far as possible, with a view to 
concluding agreements .... But an obligation to negotiate does not imply an 
obligation to reach an agreement .... 97 
In 1950 the newly established International Court ofJ ustice was asked for an 
advisory opinion on whether South Africa had a legal duty to negotiate a 
trusteeship agreement to place the former German colony of South,West 
Africa-which had been placed under South African control by a League of 
Nations mandate following World War I-under the new UN trusteeship 
system.98 While the Court majority found no such obligation, in his dissent, 
Judge Alvarez found not only a duty to negotiate but also an "obligation" to 
reach an agreement. However, he acknowledged: "even admitting that there is 
no legal obligation to conclude an agreement, there is, at least, a political 
bl" ,,99 o IgatlOn .... 
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Consider as well a 1972 arbitral award by a tribunal established to resolve 
disputes between Greece and Germany resulting from World War II. The 
tribunal was asked to decide whether an undertaking to engage in "further 
discussions" and "negotiations" included an obligation to reach an actual 
agreement. The tribunal held; 
\XTith the ratification of the Agreement, the parties ... undertook to negotiate 
their dispute anew notwithstanding the earlier refusals of both sides to retreat 
from positions that had hardened over the years. Article 19 must be considered 
as a pactum de negotiando. The arrangement arrived at between the parties in the 
present case is not a pactum de contrahendo as we understand it. This term should 
be reserved to those cases in which the parties have already undertaken a legal 
obligation to conclude an agreement .... 100 
The tribunal went on to note that even a pactum de negotiando creates legal 
obligations for the parties: 
However, a pactum de negotiando is also not without legal consequences. It means 
that both sides would make an effort, in good faith, to bring about a mutually 
satisfactory solution by way of a compromise, even if that meant the 
relinquishment of strongly held positions earlier taken. It implies a willingness for 
the purpose of negotiation to abandon earlier positions and to meet the other 
side part way.IOI 
An article published in the highly acclaimed Encyclopedia of Public 
IntematioT¥l1 Law in 1997 on these two types of agreements concluded that 
neither contains an enforceable legal obligation to do more than negotiate in 
good faith: 
In the author's view there is no relevant distinction between the two pacta in the 
legal quality of the obligations resulting from these instruments. There is no case 
where an absolute "agreement to agree" has been recognized by an international 
tribunal. Therefore, the contractual obligations to negotiate in good faith with a 
view to concluding a subsequent agreement, laid down in pactum-be it named 
pactum de contrahendo or pactum de negotiando-will only differ slightly according 
to the circumstances in the particular case: the margin of negotiation on matters 
of substance left open to the parties for shaping the ultimate agreement will be 
larger or smaller according to the degree to which the substantive contents of the, 
final agreement can be determined by means of the pactum itself.lo2 
International and National Treatises. If one were to examine "judicial 
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various 
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nations,,,103 one would find similar conclusions. One of the world's foremost 
authorities on treaty law was Lord Arnold Duncan McNair, who during his 
distinguished career served as president of both the International Court of 
Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. He provides this discussion 
in his classic 1961 treatise, The Law of Treaties: 
Pactum de contrahendo 
This term is correctly applied to an agreement by a State to conclude a later 
and final agreement, and these preliminary agreements are of frequent 
occurrence .... When they are expressed with sufficient precision, they create 
valid obligations .... 
It is, however, necessary to distinguish between a true obligation to enter into a 
later treaty and an obligation merely to embark upon negotiations for a later treaty 
and to carry them on in good faith and with a genuine desire for their success. 
Less happily in our opinion, the term pactum de contrahendo is applied to an 
obligation assumed by two or more parties to negotiate in the future with a view to 
the conclusion of a treaty. This is a valid obligation upon the parties to negotiate 
in good faith, and a refusal to do so amounts to a breach of the obligation. But the 
obligation is not the same as an obligation to conclude a treaty or to accede to an 
existing or future treaty, and the application to it of the label pactum de 
contrahendo can be misleading and should be avoided. 104 
Turning to United States law, Professor Allan Farnsworth served as 
Reporter to the Second Restatement of Contracts, and his multivolume treatise, 
Farnsworth on Contracts, is among the leading texts on the issue in the United 
States. He discusses a variety of judicial opinions refusing to enforce 
agreements to agree on the grounds that they were "vague and indefinite," and 
under the heading "Agreements to Negotiate" writes: 
Under an agreement to negotiate, the parties negotiate with the knowledge that 
if they fail to reach ultimate agreement they will not be bound. The parties to an 
agreement to negotiate do, however, undertake a general obligation of fair 
dealings in their negotiations .... [H]ere there is no way of knowing what the 
terms of the ultimate agreement would have been, or even whether the parties 
would have arrived at an ultimate agreement .... Because of the uncertain scope 
of an undertaking to negotiate, a court cannot be expected to order its specific 
performance, though it might enjoin a party that had undertaken to negotiate 
exclusively from negotiating with others.I05 
Professor Farnsworth notes that English courts have been "adamant" on this 
issue, quoting "a distinguished English judge" as having "condemned an 
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agreement 'to negotiate fair and reasonable contract sums' " by saying: "If the 
law does not recognise a contract to enter into a contract (where there is a 
fundamental term yet to be agreed) it seems to me it cannot recognise a 
contract to negotiate.,,106 
The Travaux Preparatoire. If there is any remaining doubt about whether 
Article VI of the NPT is an agreement to conclude a future agreement, it is 
useful to return to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 
Article 32 
Supplementary means of interpretation 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory works of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order 
to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to 
determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: 
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 107 
While it is difficult to contend that the language of Article VI is ambiguous 
or obscure--or otherwise meets the test for resorting to supplementary means 
of interpretation-it is nevertheless useful to consult the travaux preparatoires 
to confirm that the unanimous World Court reached the wrong result. The 
standard reference on the NPT is Mohamed I. Shaker's multivolume study, 
The Nuclear Non,Proliferation Treaty: Origin and Implementation 1959-1979, 
which provides useful background on Article VI. 
Dr. Shaker notes that the original drafts included merely preambulatory 
references to the importance of ending the nuclear arms race and achieving 
disarmament, and notes that "the two super,Powers preferred a simple treaty 
without linking it with any other arms control and disarmament measures .... "108 
India, however, "advocated that a non,proliferation treaty must embody an 
article of solemn obligation under which nuclear,weapon States would negotiate a 
meaningful programme of reduction of existing stockpiles of weapons and their 
delivery vehicles. . . . The obligation was therefore not merely to negotiate a 
meaningful programme but to undertake certain measures.,,109 Similarly, Romania 
proposed that "{t)he nuclear weapon States Parties to this Treaty undertake to 
adopt specific measures .... "110 However, as Dr. Shaker observes: 
[I] t was realised that it would not have been accepted by both the Soviet Union 
and the United States. Moreover, it was pointed out that it would have hardly been 
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feasible in legal terms to enter into obligations to arrive at agreements. The least [sic] 
that could be done, therefore, was to introduce in the NPT an obligation "to 
pursue negotiations in good faith" as proposed by Mexico, or "to negotiate" as 
proposed by Brazil .... The Mexican formula was the one adopted by the two 
co-Chairmen in their identical treaty drafts of 18 January 1968.111 
Lest there be any doubt about the obligation that resulted, Dr. Shaker notes: 
Under the pressure of the non-aligned States as well as from some of their own 
allies, the two super-Powers merely accepted in the NPT to undertake to pursue 
negotiations in good faith, but not, as pointed out by one American negotiator, 
"to achieve any disarmament agreement, since it is obviously impossible to predict the 
exact nature and results of such negotiations."m 
It is thus clear from the text, the travaux, and the underlying legal principles 
involved, that Article VI of the NPT constitutes only a pactum de negotiando-an 
obligation to negotiate in good faith towards the specified end-and, despite the 
unanimous character of the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion on this point to 
the contrary, it does not constitute a pactum de contrahendo. Indeed, the very 
language of the agreement-with references to "effective measures" and "strict 
and effective international control"--explains why this was but an undertaking 
"to pursue negotiations in good faith" on the subject. 
It might be added that if, despite the clear language to the contrary, this was 
a pactum de contrahendo, the terms of this agreement would presumably need to 
be objectively ascertainable with reasonable clarity. Unless the Court is 
prepared to spell out the precise terms of a "treaty on general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective international control," including 
identifying when, where, by whom, and under what conditions the highly 
intrusive international verification inspections are to occur-so that it will be 
possible to identify which States are in breach for failing to anticipate and 
accept those terms-it is difficult to take this portion of the Court's decision 
very seriously. It is mere brutum fulmen. 
It is evident that the Court cannot flush out even basic terms for any such 
agreement, because no such agreement ever existed in the minds of the parties 
when they entered into the treaty. Presumably, they all shared a vision that 
someday the world might live at peace without war, and some may well have 
had in mind specific provisions they intended to try to insert in any convention 
promoting this end. But the convention travaux provide no suggestion that 
anything approaching final treaty terms was ever discussed as the NPT was 
drafted. 
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Equally clearly, one can be confident that few countries would have ratified 
the NPT with the expectation that the World Court might subsequently 
declare them in breach of an obligation to ratify a subsequent treaty containing 
highly intrusive but unknowable verification and inspection provisions-not 
to mention to surrender all of their arms-and premise their security upon the 
Court imposing a verifiable and effective machinery to prevent all possible 
violations of this unknown future convention. Put simply, Article VI of the 
NPT creates nothing more than an obligation to negotiate in good faith; and 
the Court's 1996 advisory opinion cannot change that. 
A Legal Use of Nuclear Weapons: The Missing Hypothetical 
The World Court is, in the view of the present writer, clearly mistaken in its 
conclusion that the only conceivable lawful use of nuclear weapons would 
involve a threat to the survival of a State, but the fault may not be entirely that 
of the judges. Much of the public debate on this issue has been fueled by 
scholarship and government studies, dating from the 1950s and 1960s, on the 
destructive nature of nuclear weapons, and the nuclear,weapons States have 
understandably surrounded their more recent weapon' development programs 
in a shroud of secrecy. 
One would have thought, given the importance of the issue and the 
widespread reports of the existence of a new generation of low,yield, highly 
accurate nuclear weapons, that at least one of the nuclear powers would have 
set forth at least one hypothetical that the Court could use in its legal analysis 
phase-applying the law to specific facts-but other than a few vague 
references to "High Seas," "submarines," and "deserts,,,113 this does not appear 
to have been done. 
Candidly, even these brief references should have given the Court sufficient 
insight to envision some possible uses of nuclear weapons that would not 
necessarily conflict with existing laws-a single example would have permitted 
a conclusion that under certain conceivable circumstances the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons may be lawful. The ICJ Statute provides that in its advisory 
functions the Court shall be "guided by the provisions of the present Statute 
which apply in contentious cases to the extent to which it recognizes them to 
be applicable,"114 and those provisions provide a plethora of fact,finding 
instruments. Unlike the situation in American courts, where the absence of a 
party permits the tribunal to accept the facts as properly pleaded by the other 
party, the World Court must before rendering a decision in the absence of a 
party "satisfy itself ... that the claim is well founded in fact and law."115 It may 
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also call upon parties to a case "to produce any document or to supply any 
explanation,,,116 and may "entrust any individual, body, bureau, commission, or 
other organization that it may select, with the task of carrying out an inquiry or 
giving an expert opinion.,,117 
Sadly, instead of asking States who argued that not all potential threats or 
uses of nuclear weapons were per se unlawful to provide one or more examples, 
the Court essentially bypassed the task of applying the law to the most 
favorable conceivable set of facts implicit in the question before it. lIB As Judge 
Higgins observed: 
It is not sufficient, to answer the question put to it, for the Court merely briefly to 
state the requirements of the law of armed conflict (including humanitarian law) 
and then simply to move to the conclusion that the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons is generally unlawful by reference to the principles and norms .... At no 
point in its Opiaion does the Court engage in the task that is surely at the heart of 
the question asked: the systematic application of the relevant law to the use or 
threat of nuclear weapons. It reaches its conclusions without the benefit of 
detailed analysis. An essential step in the judicial process-that of legal 
reasoning-has been omitted.119 
This is unfortunate, because there are any of a number of hypotheticals 
which the Court could have envisioned (or which the nuclear-weapon States 
might have suggested) that might be used to illustrate a lawful use of a nuclear 
weapon. A single case should have allowed the Court to inform the General 
Assembly that in at least some circumstances the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons would be lawful-as the Court was neither requested nor expected to 
provide a comprehensive legal evaluation of every conceivable circumstance. 
Even at this date, it would seem useful to have such a hypothetical. 
Consider for a moment the plight of the Russian Navy, whose sailors have 
often been required to go months without a paycheck and for whom the new 
regime promises little of the glory of earlier decades. Imagine that a group of 
Russian officers and their crew decide that action is warranted, and they decide 
to sell their Delta IV, Typhoon, or newer Borey,class120 nuclear submarine to a 
terrorist group or international criminal cartel for a few million dollars. 
Alternatively, imagine they decide themselves to use this powerful weapons 
system to compel the world to restore Leninists to power throughout the old 
Soviet Empire-demanding in the process that all elected leaders of each 
current regime be publicly executed, or else. 
To enforce these demands and illustrate the else, the group controlling the 
submarine launches three SS-N-18121 sea,launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) 
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from the mid,Atlantic, each with three SaO-kiloton reentry vehicles (each 
with more than twenty,five times the destructive power of the device 
detonated over Hiroshima in 1945), targeted for air bursts over London, Paris, 
and Berlin during afternoon rush hour. Within less than an hour, millions of 
casualties are reported in Europe, and the long,term projections are even more 
frightening. 
Having demonstrated its seriousness, the submarine continues towards the 
American coastline, its captain announcing that three of its remaining missiles 
will soon be fired at targets in the Washington, D.C., New York and Chicago 
areas. It will then move to the Pacific and attack targets in Los Angeles, San 
Diego, and Mexico City; and if confirmation has not been received that the 
changes in regimes and executions of "traitors" have taken place, similar 
attacks will be made in] apan, China, and perhaps other population centers in 
Asia. To deter any foolish efforts to destroy the submarine, the captain explains 
that all of his missiles will be launched immediately at American cities upon 
any detection of another submarine or warship in its vicinity, or if the sound of 
a launched torpedo is detected. 
Let us suppose further that, with the cooperation of the Russian 
Government, the United States has been able to track the movement of the 
submarine. The Military Committee at the United Nations convenes, and 
upon its advice the Security Council immediately asks the United States to 
take effective military action to destroy the submarine before it launches the 
missile now reported to be aimed to impact within 500 meters of the UN 
Headquarters. 
Does international law really require the American representative to the 
Security Council to announce: 
Mr. President and Members of the Security Council. I have been in contact with 
my Government, and I have some good news and some bad news. The good news 
is that our Air Force reports that its pilots have the skill to drop a 20-kiloton 
nuclear device sufficiently close to the submarine that they are certain it would be 
destroyed instantaneously and without any warning, before any additional 
missiles could be launched. The bad news is that, pursuant to the legal principles 
enunciated by the International Court ofJustice in the 1996 Advisory Opinion 
on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, since the United States could clearly 
"survive" the attacks which are being threatened-albeit with the projected loss 
of 10-20 million of our people-it is unlawful for us to attempt effective measures 
to defend ourselves (or the United Nations) in this situation. Indeed, the 
weapons that previously would have been available to address such a threat were 
removed from our inventory and dismantled some years ago. Let us pray. 
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Perhaps the threat instead would come from a Libya, Iran, Sudan, North 
Korea, or even Cuba that had purchased a used Soviet diesel submarine and 
installed primitive ballistic missiles designed to disperse toxic anthrax or other 
biological agents across population centers in various countries. One could 
hypothesize numerous such scenarios that would be as credible as any 
suggestion in 1989 that a year later Saddam Hussein would invade Kuwait and 
threaten to use weapons of mass destruction against UN sanctioned forces 
trying to protect Kuwait and its neighbors. One could multiply such examples 
several fold as the venue shifted from destroying submarines or other warships 
on the High Seas, to striking tanks or super,hardened military command posts 
or weapons bunkers in the desert, to assorted other options not involving direct 
attacks near population centers. 
Indeed, as this writer has suggested elsewhere,122 one of the most effective 
means of deterring aggression is to have the capability to attack radical regime 
elites who initiate aggressive wars. Possession of a highly,accurate, low,yield, 
deep penetrating "bunker,buster" nuclear device might well persuade a future 
Saddam Hussein-who had sacrificed hundreds of thousands of Iraqi soldiers 
in his war against Iran and was clearly willing to risk massive troop loses in his 
1991 resistance to the UN Security Council-that initiating or continuing 
massive international aggression might well have hegative consequences of a 
highly personal nature.123 
One need not devote pages of analysis to demonstrate that using a nuclear 
weapon against a terrorist submarine on the high seas, if necessary to terminate 
an ongoing barrage of far more destructive weapons of mass destruction against 
innocent civilians, is clearly consistent with jus ad bellum and jus in bello. It 
follows as well that the hypothesized attacks would not "threaten the survival 
of the State.,,124 Therefore, the Court's extremely narrow exception in 
paragraph E of the Dispositif is simply wrong as a matter of international law. 
Fortunately, of course, advisory opinions of the World Court have no binding 
authority over States.125 
Making the World Safe for World War ill: 
Limiting Defense and Undermining Deterrence 
For anyone who has witnessed the inhumanity of war firsthand and cares 
about the preservation of peace, portions of the Court's advisory opinion are 
disquieting. Without in the least disputing the horrendous consequences likely 
to be associated with any use of nuclear weapons, one can still wonder whether 
the judges have forgotten the frightening realities of conventional warfare? 
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Why, one must wonder, are they so eager to outlaw even the threat of a nuclear 
response to major acts of armed international aggression-is there some sense 
of "fair play" that leads them to wish to assure future Adolph Hitlers and 
Saddam Husseins that the consequences of massive aggression will never be 
too unacceptable? 
The primary reason for the establishment of the United Nations, of which 
the International Court ofjustice is the "principal judicial organ,"126 is "to save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war .... "127 Yet many of the leaders 
of the antinuclear campaign which precipitated the General Assembly's 
request for an advisory opinion view the problem not as stopping 
aggression-irrespective of the weapons used-but as merely eliminating 
nuclear weapons. One scholar, for example, envisions "an unprecedented 
opportunity" as the world approaches the new century "to create a world in 
which our children will be free from the threat of nuclear war.,,128 One is 
tempted to respond: "You mean like in Europe in 1915 and 1943?" 
He tells us that "[s]ince 1945, humanity has lived on the edge ofaprecipice, 
with human history literally hanging in the balance,,,129 and that "[f]or over 
forty years, the world has lived with the relentless and harrowing fear that the 
nuclear arms race might eventually result in a nuclear war."130 One need not 
quarrel with such conclusions to note, as well, that in no small part because of 
the perceived horrendous consequences of such a war, during this same period, 
most of the world has also lived in peace. 
This same writer expresses understandable alarm at estimates that a 
strategic nuclear exchange attacking only "key military targets" could kil110 to 
20 million people; 13l but he fails to remind us that two,to,four times that many 
people died in the conventional phases of World War II,132 that more than 100 
million people have died in major conventional wars in this century,133 and that 
advances in conventional military technology in the past half,century strongly 
suggest that a non,nuclear World War III could be far more destructive of 
human life than were any earlier wars-even if one assumes that, once started, 
such a conflict would not ultimately escalate to the use of even illegal weapons 
of mass destruction. 
The most vociferous critics of nuclear deterrence apparently see no 
distinction between the possession of such weapons by liberal democracies 
firmly committed to upholding the Charter principles and possession by rogue 
States and terrorist groups-ignoring a compelling body of political science 
that demonstrates that by far the most important variable in predicting the 
outbreak of war is not the existence or absence of any category of weapons, but 
the nature of the political systems of the potential parties to the conflict.134 
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Compelling statistical data indicate that democracies do not attack 
democracies, and aggression results not from peaceloving States being too well 
armed, but far more commonly from a relatively small number of radical regime 
leaders concluding that they will benefit from aggression because their 
potential adversaries lack either the will or the ability to respond effectively to 
aggression.135 As the American Founding Fathers understood,136 and as the 
Latin maxim qui desiderat pacem praeparet bellum 137 affirms, it is perceived 
weakness, rather than strength, in its potential victims that encourages 
aggression. 
Indeed, the most impressive contemporary scholarship demonstrates with 
remarkable clarity that both World War I and World War II resulted in large 
part from perceptions by potential aggressors that their victims, and States 
which might come to their aid, lacked both the will and the ability to respond 
effectively to aggression.138 Thus, the eminent Yale University Historian 
Donald Kagan notes that, following World War I, "British leaders disarmed 
swiftly and thoroughly and refused to rearm in the face of obvious danger until 
it was too late to save France and almost too late to save Britain,,,139 and he 
observes that the failure of the League of Nations to act to defend Ethiopia 
from aggression in 1936 helped persuade Mussolini to join forces with Hitler: 
"The democracies seemed weak, indecisive, and cowardly, and their failure and 
inaction gave courage to their enemies.,,140 
When Hitler moved to remilitarize the Rhineland in violation of the 
Versailles Treaty, Professor Kagan notes that "British policy was to avoid war at 
all costs,,,141 and that Hitler had actually promised his generals that he would 
withdraw his forces at the first sight of French resistance. He quotes Hitler as 
later writing: "The forty,eight hours after the march into the Rhineland were 
the most nerve,wracking in my life. If the French had then marched into the 
Rhineland we would have had to withdraw with our tails between our legs, for 
the military resources at our disposal would have been wholly inadequate for 
even a moderate resistance.,,142 Professor Kagan writes: 
There is no doubt that some leaders of the German Army were powerfully 
opposed to an attack on Czechoslovakia ... [in 1938] because they believed it 
would lead to a general war for which Germany was not prepared and which it 
was bound to lose. When they confronted Hitler he assured them that Britain 
and France would not fight .... Perhaps the most important reason for the failure 
of this belated attempt at deterrence was that it lacked credibility. Whatever its 
military capabilities, would Britain have the will to use them? Whatever their 
commitments, would the British have the courage to honor them? ... Small 
wonder that Hitler never seems to have taken his opponents' warnings seriously. 
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As he laid plans for the attack' on Poland he discounted the danger from the 
leaders of Britain and France. "I saw them at Munich," he said. "They are little 
worms. ,,143 
World War II did not result from a failure of "arms control" or the presence 
of too many weapons. The London and Washington naval agreements helped 
weaken the military power of the democracies, and after the war was over, 
Japanese leaders explained that watching movie newsclips of American 
soldiers in Mississippi training with wooden rifles had helped convince them of 
American weakness-and thus strengthened the case for attacking Pearl 
Harbor. 144 
Properly utilized, international law has a powerful contribution to make to 
the cause of international peace and security. But parchment barriers like the 
NPT, the Geneva Protocol on chemical and bacteriological warfare,145 and the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) , 146 are not enough to guarantee peace. 
The reason Hitler did not use his chemical weapons when the tides of battle 
turned against him during World War II was not out of respect for 
international law, but because he knew the Allies would retaliate in kind as a 
belligerent reprisal. Indeed, if all that were necessary to control aggression were 
more solemn, legally, binding, promises, we would need no new treaties-for 
any act of aggression will automatically breach the most fundamental principle 
of the UN Charter.147 Why assume that a tyrant who is willing to ignore the UN 
Charter is going to abide by any lesser legal obligation that is not self,enforcing? 
The world should have learned from recent experiences with North Korea 
and Iraq that, by itself, the NPT is not likely to prevent the unlawful 
procurement of nuclear weapons. As has been noted time and again, that 
"genie" is out of the bottle, and the basic technology is reportedly even 
available in public libraries and on the Internet. Efforts to erect new legal 
barriers to the possession, threat, or use of nuclear weapons-while not 
necessarily unhelpful or a bad idea-risk missing the point that the primary 
goal is to prevent war of any kind. 
University of Iowa Professor Bums Weston is certainly one of th~ most 
intelligent, articulate, and respected scholars in the "ban,the,bomb" campi 
and in a 1989 address to the First World Congress of the International 
Association of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms, Professor Weston observed: "to 
rid ourselves of the nuclear habit we must rid ourselves also of the war habit. "148 
Yet he acts as if there were no distinction between aggressor and victim, 
contending that "nothing is more menacing to the long,term well,being of our 
planet than the sincerely communicated threat to use nuclear weapons if and 
when sufficiently provoked."149 He apparently sees no moral distinction, and 
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no implication for the preservation of peace, between that "threat" being made 
by someone like Saddam Hussein to compel peaceful Kuwait to submit to his 
aggression, and such a "threat" being made by a State that is being "provoked" 
by a flagrant act of armed international aggression and is acting under the 
authority of a resolution of the Security Council, in order to dissuade the 
aggressor from resorting to the illegal use of weapons of mass destruction that 
might claim millions of innocent lives.150 There is a difference. 
Rather than permitting peaceloving States to use the threat151 of a nuclear 
response to deter aggression and protect peace, Professor Weston would have 
us disarm them of the weapons that have proven most effective in deterring 
massive acts of international aggression for most of this century; suggesting in 
the alternative that all the world really needs are a few new "mutual 
nonaggression" pacts. In 1989 he wrote of the need for such treaties between 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact,152 and between the United States and the Soviet 
Union;153 and one might assume that today his solution to what might be called 
the "Saddam Hussein problem" would be to get the Iraqi leader to sign a new 
binding international agreement promising, henceforth, to be good. 
Of course, Iraq is already a party to the UN Charter, the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty, and various other solemn international treaties 
which clearly prohibit the things Saddam has been doing (invading his 
neighbors, developing chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, etc.); but 
surely if we could just get him to sign one more piece of paper he would change 
his ways-especially if we could assure him that his victims will no longer be 
able to respond most effectively if he violates his promise. 
The logic is so compelling that one can only wonder why the world didn't 
think of it earlier? Imagine the lives that might have been saved had we just 
been able to get Germany and Japan to ratify a binding international treaty 
condemning "recourse to war for the solution of international controversies" 
and renouncing war "as an instrument of national policy"154 a decade before the 
outbreak of World War II. Readers who recall the optimism that greeted the 
1928 Kellogg~Briand Pact may recall as well that it was solemnly ratified by 
both Japan 155 and Germany156 -leading many people to conclude after the 
outbreak of World War II that international law was inherently ineffective as 
an instrument of peace. A better lesson to draw from this unfortunate 
experience is that unenforced international law is an unreliable barrier to 
aggression; 157 and a corollary may well be that aggression is encouraged when 
law~abiding States are denied the legal right to seek to deter aggression with 
their most effective legal weapons and the aid of other peaceloving States. 
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Put simply, the (former) President of the World Court was mistaken when he 
described nuclear weapons as being "the ultimate evil .... "158 In this context, if 
there is an "ultimate evil" it is probably the kind of armed international aggression 
that results in the large,scale slaughter of innocent people and the subjugation of 
human freedom. When nuclear weapons--or any weapons---are used for that 
purpose, they are used in an evil manner. When they are used to dissuade potential 
aggressors from slaughtering or enslaving their neighbors, they serve a positive 
moral value. The weapons themselves have no inherent moral content.159 
The Military Utility of Nuclear Weapons 
A central theme of much of the legal criticism of nuclear weapons is that, 
because of their inherent nature, they have no legitimate military purpose or 
value. Thus, States should not hesitate to give them up, and there is no 
legitimate "cost" in banning them. For example, in his book Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons: The Relevance of International Law, Elliott L. Meyrowitz 
asserts that "the nature and effect of nuclear weapons are such that they are 
inherently incapable of being limited with any degree of certainty to a specific 
military target.,,160 From such reasoning he concludes that "nuclear weapons 
have no military utility.,,161 
This is simply mistaken. Even if one were to assume that no State would ever 
likely again elect to resort to such weapons during combat, it is a dangerous 
fallacy to assume that weapons can have no utility or "military value" outside of 
combat. Indeed, the great Chinese strategist Sun Tzu emphasized this point 
well more than 2,500 years ago when he wrote: "For to win one hundred 
victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy 
without fighting is the acme of skill.,,162 
A thorough discussion of the utility of nuclear weapons is far beyond the 
scope of this short chapter, but two examples should suffice to establish the 
point. The first is the critically important role that nuclear weapons obviously 
played in keeping Europe at peace throughout the Cold War; and the second is 
the successful use of the implied threat of a nuclear reprisal if Saddam Hussein 
continued with his plans to use chemical or biological weapons during the 
1990-91 Persian Gulf conflict. 
Nuclear Deterrence and the Cold War. It is critically important to keep in 
mind, as the world seeks relief from its fear of intentional or accidental nuclear 
holocaust, that the world as a whole has seen a remarkable era of relative peace 
for more than half,a,century, and that no single factor has likely played a more 
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decisive role in bringing this about than the shared perception of the 
unacceptability and futility of nuclear war and the realization that such an 
outcome might be an unintended consequence of the escalation of any major 
act of aggression by conventional weapons. 
Conrad Harper, the Legal Adviser to the u.s. Department of State in 1995, 
cautioned the Court that "nuclear deterrence has contributed substantially 
during the past 50 years to the enhancement of strategic stability, the avoidance 
of global conflict and the maintenance of international peace and security.,,163 
Similarly, Sir Nicholas Lyell, Agent for the United Kingdom, observed: 
[T]hese two requests [by the General Assembly and World Health 
Organisation] ignore ... the somber but vital role played by nuclear weapons in 
the system of international security over the past 50 years .... Our real world 
remains a fragmented and dangerous place, and in this real world, to call in 
question now the legal basis of the system of deterrence on which so many States 
have relied for so long for the protection of their people could have a profoundly 
destabilizing effect. l64 
Perhaps no one formally involved in the case expressed this point more 
eloquently than Judge Rosalyn Higgins (United Kingdom): 
One cannot be unaffected by the knowledge of the unbearable suffering and vast 
destruction that nuclear weapons can cause. And one can well understand that 
it is expected of those who care about such suffering and devastation that they 
should declare its cause illegal. It may well be asked of a judge whether, in 
engaging in legal analysis of such concepts as "unnecessary suffering," "collateral 
damage" and "entitlement to self-defence," one has not lost sight of the real 
human circumstances involved. The judicialloadestar ... must be those values 
that international law seeks to promote and protect. In the present case, it is the 
physical survival of the peoples that we must constantly have in view. \Y/ e live in 
a decentralized world order, in which some States are known to possess nuclear 
weapons but choose to remain outside of the non-proliferation treaty system; 
while other such non-parties have declared their intention to obtain nuclear 
weapons; and yet other States are believed clandestinely to possess, or to be 
working shortly to possess nuclear weapons (some of whom indeed may be a 
party to the NPT). It is not clear to me that either a pronouncement of illegality 
in all circumstances of the use of nuclear weapons or the answers formulated by 
the Court in paragraph 2E best serve to protect mankind against that 
unimaginable suffering that we all fear. 165 
Deterring Saddam's WMDs in the Gulf War. Anyone who doubts that the 
threat of a nuclear response can deter wrongful conduct should read the 
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Dissenting Opinion in the Nuclear Weapons case of then, World Court Vice 
President (now President) Steven M. Schwebel (United States), who cites 
chapter and verse in demonstrating that in 1990-91, American threats to 
retaliate with nuclear weapons persuaded the Iraqi regime not to make use of 
the 150 bombs and 25 ballistic, missile warheads filed with anthrax toxin that 
had been specially prepared for use during the war. Judge Schwebel quotes at 
length, for example, from a Washington Post article of26 August 1995: 
Iraq has released to the United Nations new evidence that it was prepared to 
use deadly toxins and bacteria against U.S. and allied forces during the 1991 
Persian Gulf War that liberated Kuwait from its Iraqi occupiers, U.N. 
Ambassador Rolf Ekeus said today. 
Ekeus, the chief U.N. investigator of Iraq's weapons programs, said Iraqi 
officials admitted to him in Baghdad last week that in December 1990 they 
loaded three types of biological agents into roughly 200 missile warheads and 
aircraft bombs that were then distributed to air bases and a missile site .... 
U.S. and U.N. officials said the Iraqi weapons contained enough biological 
agents to have killed hundreds of thousands of people and spread horrible 
diseases .... 
Ekeus said Iraqi officials claimed they decided not to use the weapons after 
receiving a strong but ambiguously worded warning from the Bush 
administration on Jan. 9, 1991, that any use of unconventional warfare would 
provoke a devastating response. 
Iraq's leadership assumed this meant Washington would retaliate with 
nuclear weapons, Ekeus said he was told. 166 
Judge Schwebel also quotes from an interview with Iraqi Foreign Minister 
Tariq Aziz on the u.S. public television program Frontline, in which Aziz was 
asked why the expected chemical attack on u.S. forces "never came." He 
replied: "We didn't think that it was wise to use them. That's all what I can say. 
That was not-was not wise to use such kind of weapons in such kind of a war 
with-with such an enemy."167 
After placing on the record an abundance of evidence of the impact on Iraqi 
policy of the American threatl68 to retaliate with nuclear weapons in the event 
of an Iraqi use of weapons of mass destruction (even though such a response 
had apparently been eliminated as an option before the war started169), Judge 
Schwebel concluded: 
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Thus there is on record remarkable evidence indicating that an aggressor was or 
may have been deterred from using outlawed weapons of mass destruction 
against forces and countries arrayed against its aggression at the call of the 
United Nations by what the aggressor perceived to be a threat to use nuclear 
weapons against it should it first use weapons of mass destruction against the 
forces of the coalition. Can it seriously be maintained that Mr. Baker's 
calculated-and apparently successful-threat was unlawful? Surely the 
principles of the United Nations Charter were sustained rather than transgressed 
by the threat.17o 
The Characteristics of Modem Nuclear Weapons. For perhaps understandable 
reasons, governments are reluctant to discuss publicly the details of their most 
sensitive military programs. Former government officials and employees who 
have been granted access to highly classified defense programs are usually 
prohibited from discussing such details as well. Having been personally 
involved-quite uns~ccessfully-in trying to persuade the United States 
Government to declassify persuasive evidence in connection with an earlier ICJ 
case more than a dozen years ago,l7l the present writer is not completely 
surprised that the official submissions to the Court did not focus on the 
technical details of the latest generation of nuclear weapons. Perhaps the 
strongest statement in this regard was by the Government of the United 
Kingdom, which told the Court: 
[M]uch of the writing on nuclear weapons on which these arguments rely dates 
from the 1950's and early 1960's. Modem nuclear weapons are capable of far 
more precise targeting and can therefore be directed against specific military 
objectives without the indiscriminate effect on the civilian population which the 
older literature assumed to be inevitable.172 
Many references to the nature of nuclear weapons in presentations to the 
Court, and even portions of the Court's opinion,173 suggest that this 
observation by the United Kingdom is correct. Not all "nuclear weapons" are 
identical. The Soviet Union, for example, once designed a nuclear weapon 
with a yield of 150 megatons and tested one with a yield of approximately 50 
megatons. l74 Identifying a use for such weapons consistent with the law of 
armed conflict would be extremely difficult, and most possible uses of a weapon 
capable of 1/100th of that level of destructiveness might well conflict with the 
law-particularly if used anywhere near a concentration of noncombatants. 
But the reported trend in the latest generation of nuclear weapons is towards 
much smaller and far more accurate devices, and it is these devices that must 
be considered-in the light of all of the circumstances of a given situation-in 
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assessing the lawfulness of a potential use. The Court seems to have made no 
effort to inquire into the characteristics of such weapons,175 apparently finding 
it more convenient to make assumptions based upon knowledge acquired in 
earlier decades and undocumented assertions made by critics who quite likely 
were also not privy to information on highly classified defense programs of the 
nuclear,weapons States. 
Thus, the President of the Court concluded that: 
Nuclear weapons can be expected-in the present state of scientific 
development at least-to cause indiscriminate victims among combatants and 
non-combatants alike, as well as unnecessary suffering among both categories. 
The very nature of this blind weapon therefore has a destabilizing effect on 
hUlllanitarian law which regulates discernment in the type of weapon used .... 
Until scientists are able to develop a "clean" nuclear weapon which would 
distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, nuclear weapons will 
clearly have indiscriminate effects and constitute an absolute challenge to 
humanitarian law.176 
The present writer has had no access to classified information on this topic 
in well over a decade, but judging from readily available press reports it seems 
likely that modem nuclear weapons have already satisfied this requirement. A 
report in Time magazine in connection with the recent confrontation between 
Saddam Hussein and the UN Security Council, for example, noted that "New 
weapons with ever increasing accuracy led the Pentagon to be confident that 
few will stray, thus limiting what military euphemists refer to as 'collateral 
damage'-innocent, but dead, civilians."177 It notes that in the September 
1995 attacks on Bosnian Serb strongholds that led to the Dayton Accord, the 
Air Force reported 97 percent accuracy of its "smart bombs"-far superior to 
the success record in Operation Desert Storm less than five years earlier. By 
using Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites for guidance (rather than 
lasers, which could be thrown off target by smoke or bad weather), and new 
high,tech fuses that can actually "count" floors in an underground bunker and 
explode only upon reaching a pre,selected level, the United States had 
achieved weapons of unprecedented accuracy.178 
Because of the increased accuracy, most targets can be defeated by the use of 
conventional high-explosive warheads, such as the GBU,28179 and GBU,3S180 
S,OOO-pound "bunker busters;" however, the highly regarded Aviation Week & 
Space Technology quotes a retired senior Air Force general as saying "You can't 
attack all the chemical and biological weapons storage sites" in Iraq, because 
"[s]ome are too far underground .... "181 
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Frank Robbins, Director of the Precision Strike Weapons Technology 
Office at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida, was quoted in Defense Week as stating 
that GPS,guided munitions "could hit a target the size of a man's upper torso 
within a metropolitan area as large as ... Washington,Baltimore.,,182 However, 
when that man's upper torso,size target is buried deeply underground, below 
the range of any conventional weapon that can be carried by the latest U.S. 
bombers,183 the only means of deterring a foreign tyrant considering launching 
an aggressive war--or neutralizing his supply of weapons of mass destruction 
before they can be fired at the civilian populations of neighboring States-may 
be with a nuclear warhead. 
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists reported in late 1997 that the United 
States had earlier that year deployed the B61 earth,penetrating nuclear 
warhead to destroy "superhardened" or "deeply buried" targets "with great 
precision and bewildering agility, no matter their location.,,184 The article 
asserts that the United States is seeking the ability to destroy "underground 
targets, with greater discrimination," for possible counterproliferation 
purposes, and that one recent report by nuclear weapons experts suggests that 
"a small nuclear warhead [like the B61] is the best way to neutralize anthrax 
agents." The present writer emphasizes that he has no personal knowledge 
about any of these programs, but assuming for the moment that these generally 
well, connected sources are correct, they identify critically important military 
missions which might not be achievable through the use of conventional 
ordinance. While it is obvious that the legality of any particular use of such 
weapons must be determined in the context of the purpose for which it is used, 
projected collateral damage, and other considerations, it is equally clear that 
not every use of such weapons would be unlawful. Indeed, one could easily 
conceive of settings in which such a use of nuclear weapons would claim few if 
any noncombatant lives, while in the process saving millions oflives that might 
otherwise be vulnerable to weapons of mass destruction. 
Once again, the utility of such weapons must also be evaluated in terms of 
their contribution to maintaining peace by deterring potential aggressors from 
initiating conflict. If small nuclear weapons make it possible for the United 
States to place the potential aggressor State's leadership at risk, and to 
neutralize an anthrax bomb before it can harm anyone, this serves both to 
diminish the perceived value of anthrax weapons and to place at personal risk 
decision makers who may be contemplating threatening the peace. Both of 
these consequences are highly desirable-irrespective of whether such 
weapons would ever actually be used in combat. 
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Perhaps it was inevitable-and even wise-for the Court to refrain from 
making a detailed speculative inquiry into the technological characteristics of 
modern nuclear weapons. But without doing so, the Court obviously lacked the 
knowledge necessary to draw legal conclusions based upon the application of 
the legal principles it had identified as being germane to the threat or use of 
these weapons. Its conclusions must therefore be considered in the light of this 
shortcoming. 
There are some very able, knowledgeable, and respected military 
professionals who have concluded that nuclear weapons are unnecessary and 
inherently immoral. l85 Their technical understanding of such weapons is far 
superior to that of the present writer, and in terms of the actual use of such 
weapons they may well be right. Surely, anyone with an ounce of sense realizes 
that nuclear war would be horrible beyond description. But precisely because of 
their perceived horror, the existence of these weapons has ironically thus far 
been a powerful force for world peace. And with admitted exceptions, military 
and political leaders in the democracies who know the most about these 
weapons continue to believe they have military utility.186 
Nuclear Weapons as a Force for Peace 
Perhaps it is time for a "reality check." Strategic nuclear weapons are 
capable of incomprehensible devastation, and it doesn't require a World Court 
decision to make this point. It is not coincidental that they have not been used 
a single time in more than half,a,century since they were first developed and 
used to bring an end to World War II. One can only pray that they will never 
have to be used again. 
But one can also look back at the Cold War era and realize that the world 
might well be a far different place today had such frightening weapons not been 
introduced into national inventories. They have imposed a level of sanity on 
world leaders who otherwise had considerable incentives to promote violent 
change. Largely because of the respect among decision makers on all sides for 
the consequences of nuclear conflict, an unstable political confrontation that 
might easily have resulted in World War III was replaced by nearly 
half,a,century of political struggle and occasional detente, punctuated on 
occasion by relatively minorlS7 coercive settings on the periphery of the 
presumptive battlefield. 
The foes of nuclear weapons will not acknowledge it, but it is quite probable 
that the existence of nuclear weapons was the single most important factor in 
keeping Europe at peace for nearly half,a,century following World War 
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II-longer than Europe had experienced peace in many centuries. To be sure, 
the standoff was frightening and the risks of error were horrific; but the 
existence of a nuclear ,armed NATO probably saved tens of millions of lives in 
Europe alone. 
Complete Disarmament Is an Impractical Dream 
In a 1793 letter to James Monroe, Thomas Jefferson remarked, with his 
characteristic perception: "I believe that through all America there has been 
but a single sentiment on the subject of peace and war, which was in favor of 
the former .... We have differed, perhaps, as to the tone of conduct exactly 
adapted to secure it."ISS We may also have differed on the price to be paid for it, 
for as John Stuart Mill once noted: 
War is an ugly thing, but not the ugliest of things: the decayed and degraded state 
of moral and patriotic feeling which thinks nothing worth a war, is worse .... A 
man who has nothing which he is willing to fight for, nothing which he cares 
more about than he does about his personal safety, is a miserable creature who 
has no chance of being free, unless made and kept so by the exertions of better 
men than himself.Is9 
Who doesn't want peace? No rational, sane citizen of any country favors war 
when peace can be had without price, and the vision of a world without war is 
enticing. A simple-perhaps overly so--logic suggests that since wars are 
fought with weapons, if we can just rid the world of weapons we can guarantee 
peace. Wars, by this theory, result largely from the existence of weapons and 
from military imbalances which promise benefits for the strong. (The wisdom of 
this theory is easily established by reviewing the past two centuries of 
U.s.,Canadian relations.) 
Since we all in principle favor peace and would welcome a world in which all 
beings lived in peace and respected the rights of others, it follows that we would 
incorporate the aspirational goal of general and complete disarmament in 
precatory language designed to make everyone feel good at the conclusion of a 
less ambitious effort to control instruments of war-as was apparently done in 
Article VI of the NPT.190 This is not to suggest that the parties were disingenuous 
in committing to pursue negotiations "on a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective international control"-presumably 
every peaceloving State would favor such a goal, if the control machinery were 
certain to be effective and could be implemented without totally undermining 
the sovereignty of individual States and the privacy of their citizens-but it is 
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likely that only the most naive delegates anticipated witnessing the conclusion 
of such an agreement in their own lifetimes. 
Professor Richard B. Bilder is but one of many respected commentators to 
observe that the "nuclear genie" is "out of the bottle," and that "[t]here are 
already over 50,000 of those weapons, knowledge of how to build them will 
never disappear .... "191 Certain chemical and biological weapons are even 
simpler to build and to conceal. The inability of the world community to 
control illicit drugs provides some insight to this dilemma, and much of that 
activity takes place despite serious efforts by host States to prevent it. Those 
who recall the experience of the Gulf War will realize that it is necessary to be 
able to send inspectors not only to established military installations and 
chemical or medical laboratories, but also to inspect such places as "baby milk" 
factories192-and quite likely alleged "religious" and "cultural" properties as 
well. Indeed, one might anticipate that if any single category of facility were 
declared "off limits" for inspectors, that would be the most attractive place to 
engage in prohibited behavior. 
One would certainly expect a clever leader who wished to engage in covert 
development and production of prohibited weapons to try to "raise the costs of 
inspection" by concealing such activities in locations that might prove 
embarrassing for foreigners to enter, and then to use political warfare 
techniques to intimidate and· discredit the inspectors if they nevertheless 
endeavored to do their job. At the same time, potential violators would 
presumably demand the most intrusive inspections within democratic 
States-both as an intelligence,gathering technique and as a means of 
pressuring other States to accept what might be called "informal 
accommodations" which would lessen the mutual inconvenience of 
inspections {and probably in the process make them virtually meaningless).193 
Professor Almond has observed: "Because disarmament agreements are very 
difficult to verify without major intrusions into the territory of each of the 
parties, the possibility of concluding such an agreement is slight."194 Other 
experts have made similar points.195 It is also clear that the closer one comes to 
total disarmament, the more significant a small amount of "cheating" becomes 
and thus the greater the incentive to cheat. In a world with tens of thousands of 
nuclear weapons, a State that can covertly manufacture half,a,dozen nuclear 
devices is not going to dramatically transform the balance of power-especially 
if the Security Council can remain functional. But if alllaw,abiding countries 
eliminate all of their nuclear weapons-and, pursuant to the Court's 
interpretation of Article VI of the NPT, their conventional weapons as 
well-then the incentives for an ambitious tyrant to secretly build a small 
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inventory of prohibited weapons are considerably enhanced. A tyrant with a 
global monopoly on weapons of mass destruction, and a willingness to actually 
use them, would be a powerful actor indeed. So, in the absence of "strict and 
effective international control" to guarantee (assuming that were even 
theoretically possible) that no State was "breaking the rules," an unenforceable 
agreement requiring States to destroy all nuclear weapons (or all weapons of 
any kind) could well prove highly counterproductive to such Charter values as 
international peace, human dignity, and freedom. 
Today, any tyrant contemplating building nuclear weapons for aggressive 
purposes must consider the assurances of the world's strongest military powers 
that they will come to the defense of any NPT party that is' a victim of 
aggression or a threat of aggression involving nuclear weapons.196 That is a 
fairly strong disincentive: Why bother to build a small nuclear stockpile to 
harass your neighbors if the immediate consequence will be to bring you into 
conflict with the major nuclear powers? We must ask why the World Court 
seems so anxious to undermine this disincentive, in the process increasing the 
relative political and military value of a small stock of illicit nuclear weapons 
(and thus the incentive to acquire them) perhaps a thousand,fold? 
Any country that pretends to take seriously the vision of general and 
complete disarmament ought first to be willing to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of such a concept at the national level. Let them first take the 
guns and clubs from their own military and police forces, remove all kitchen 
knives from their homes, and display for the world to admire a functioning 
utopian model of universal peace and tranquillity without the threat or use of 
force. (To paraphrase a comment once made about the practical shortcomings 
of socialism: "nice idea; wrong species.") Until that is done, the serious business 
of trying to promote a more peaceful world ought not be distracted by such silly, 
dangerous, illusions. 
G iven the political nature of the entire process, and the risk that under pressure from so,called "peace" groups, NGOs, and numerous 
Third, World States, the Court would have ignored the law and pronounced a 
dangerous new doctrine limiting the rights of States to use nuclear weapons to 
deter aggression and defend themselves and their allies if necessary, one must 
on balance view the advisory opinion with relief and some satisfaction. 
Basically, the Court got the law right. It overwhelmingly concluded that there 
is no conventional prohibition per se against the threat or use of nuclear 
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weapons, and similarly found no rule of customary law to support the position 
embodied in the General Assembly Resolution. It also quite properly noted 
that, like all weapons, nuclear weapons may not be used in violation of jus ad 
bellum or jus in bello-such as to commit aggression against a prohibited target 
or in a manner disproportional or unnecessary to the legitimate defensive needs 
of a particular situation. It also noted that the highly destructive nature of such 
weapons, and the commonly associated collateral effects like fallout and 
radioactive contamination, clearly made such weapons unsuitable for any but 
the most serious of settings. From the standpoint of its proper function and the 
rules of international law, had the opinion stopped there it would have been 
not only unobjectionable but quite commendable. 
From a political standpoint, however, such an opinion would have been less 
than ideal, as it would have constituted a complete rejection of the views of the 
countries and NGOs that had championed the initiative. While the Court's 
courage in resisting political pressure on the fundamental legal issues raised by 
the request is commendable, its decision to go further and include language 
apparently carefully designed to placate this considerable political bloc (and 
presumably the personal preferences of several of the judges) is regrettable. The 
decision led the Court first to depart from the judicial task of identifying and 
applying legal principles to specific facts associated with the highly technical 
and secretive field of modem nuclear weapons technology for which it lacked 
both the necessary factual information and the scientific expertise to make 
meaningful judgments; and secondly to gratuitously address an issue that had 
not been part of the request-and, more sadly still, to arrive unanimously at the 
wrong answer. 
As has been discussed, the Court's speculation about possible uses of nuclear 
weapons that might comply with existing jus in bellum quickly took the judges 
into a realm where they lacked sufficient expertise or information to make 
sound judgments. Apparently (and understandably) not being familiar with the 
characteristics of the latest generation of nuclear weapons, the Court seems to 
have assumed that any such weapons would necessarily and indiscriminately 
slaughter hundreds of thousands if not millions of combatants and 
noncombatants alike; and trying to hypothesize any scenario in which such 
conduct would not conflict with the laws governing military operations was, not 
surprisingly, difficult. 
Trying to emphasize the extreme nature of any such exception, the Court 
spoke in terms of defending against a threat to the survival of a State-which is 
not a bad example of a situation in which resort to a nuclear weapon might be 
justified. But it is hardly the only example. It would seem clear, for example, 
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that a victim of aggression that concluded that the use of nuclear weapons 
against an aggressor's underground stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction 
(or hardened military delivery systems for such weapons) was the only defense 
likely to save the lives of tens of millions of its citizens-even though the State 
might ultimately "survive" with even half of its original population-would be 
permitted under international law to make use of such weapons. The mere 
threat of such a defensive response is still less objectionable as a means of 
dissuading aggressive intentions. 
As an aside, some confusion may result from a misreading of the quite 
accurate and important language in paragraph 47 of the Court's opinion 
linking the lawfulness of a "threat" to use force with the underlying question of 
whether the actual use of force in that setting is permissible under the Charter. 
The Court concluded: 
The notions of "threat" and "use" of force under Article 2, paragraph 4, of the 
Charter stand together in the sense that if the use of force itself in a given case is 
illegal-for whatever reason-the threat to use such force will likewise be illegal. 
In short, if it is to be lawful, the declared readiness of a State to use force must be 
a use of force that is in conformity with the Charter.197 
This is correct. But it does not follow that this rule-which governs jus ad 
bellum and is associated with Article 2 (4) of the Charter-applies in analyzing a 
threat or use of force under jus in bello. A State is required to consider the 
probable magnitude and risk of collateral damage to noncombatants when 
deciding whether it is lawful to attack an otherwise lawful military target, and 
for that reason, some tyrants find it convenient to place important military 
targets in the middle of population centers-presumably hoping that even if it 
remains "legal" for a country like the United States to attack the target (which 
it generally does), considerations of humanity and more pragmatic concerns of 
public opinion will act as a deterrent. But a threat to use nuclear (or other) 
weapons in a defensive response to armed aggression does not endanger the 
interests protected by international humanitarian law.198 Since, as already 
noted, the aggressive threat or use of nuclear weapons is already prohibited by 
the Charter, any analysis of potential defensive behavior needs to discriminate 
between actual use (which must comply with jus in bello) and expressed or 
implied threats aimed at enhancing deterrence. Deterring armed international 
aggression, after all, is an important Charter value. 
The legal test that ought to be used in responding to the General Assembly's 
question is not whether the Court majority successfully anticipated every 
future act of aggression which might legally be met with a particular defensive 
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nuclear response, but whether in every given situation the use of such weapons 
necessarily violates some governing legal principle. The Court's ignorance 
about recent (or future) technological developments in the characteristics of 
nuclear weapons does not alter the principle legal conclusions of the opinion. 
The proper test of the lawfulness of nuclear weapons is precisely the same as the 
test applied to any other weapon that has not been expressly banned: Does the 
action under all of the relevant circumstances violate any applicable provision 
of international law? 
Applying this test, it is abundantly clear that: 
Nuclear weapons may not be used aggressively, or in any other manner contrary 
to a State's relevant treaty commitmentsj 
Nuclear weapons may not be used contrary to any applicable rule of customary 
international law binding upon the State considering their usej199 
Nuclear weapons may not be used against targets prohibited by international 
lawj2°O 
Nuclear weapons may not be used even defensively except consistent with the 
legal rules which constrain the use of all force in self-defense and collective 
self-defense, such as necessity, proportionality, and discrimination. 
These principles are uncontroversial, unobjectionable, and fully consistent 
with United States military doctrine dating back more than four decades.201 
Beyond that, the Court's speculation that the horrendous inherent 
characteristics of all nuclear weapons would preclude any use from satisfying 
these legal tests that did not involve a threat to "the very survival of a State" is 
only legally meaningful to the extent that the Court's comprehension of the 
nature of such weapons-today and tomorrow-was accurate. The legally 
significant point to the opinion is the test to be applied, not the prescience of 
the judges in foreseeing every conceivable circumstances that might threaten a 
State in the years ahead, or their perspicacity in understanding current military 
technology. To the extent the Court's uninformed and speculative 
inquiry-one might better say noninquiry, as there was little evidence of serious 
inquiry in the opinion-into the technical nature of modem nuclear weapons 
was unsoundly premised, the legal conclusions seven of the fourteen judges 
drew from that factual predicate are of little value. They certainly do not 
constitute binding rules limiting the conduct of States. 
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As much as the sponsors of the General Assembly request may have wished, 
once the Court properly recognized that neither conventional nor customary 
international law prohibits the defensive threat or use of nuclear weapons (so 
long as such conduct complies with the law of armed conflict), the Court 
clearly lacked the authority to modify those legal rules to conform to the 
political preferences of members of the Court or a plurality of members of the 
United Nations. Therefore, the Court's subsequent speculation about possible 
settings in which the use of such weapons would comply with the laws of armed 
conflict may have been a useful reminder of the potential horror of nuclear 
weapons, but to the extent it was premised upon factual error or limited vision, 
it is of no legal significance. The test remains whether a threat or use of nuclear 
weapons is consistent with the relevant rules of international law under all of 
the specific circumstances in which it occurs. It is a good test, and it is precisely 
the test that the United States has long recognized as controlling. The fact that 
the judges who most strongly favored a per se prohibition on the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons found it necessary to dissent from the majority opinion stands 
in clear refutation of the "spin control" efforts of antinuclear activists to portray 
the advisory opinion in a light more favorable to their political perspective. The 
clear reality is that they lost, and, as ironic as it may seem to some, the cause of 
international peace and effective deterrence emerges clearly victorious from a 
proper reading of the case. 
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